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What Are the Predictors of System-Wide Trust Loss in
Transportation Automation?
Stephen Rice, Scott R. Winter, John E. Deaton and Ismael Cremer
(Florida Institute of Technology–Melbourne)
Abstract
Prior research has examined how individuals place trust in single (e.g., Meyer, 2001, 2004) and multiple (e.g., Geels-Blair, Rice, &
Schwark, 2013) automated devices when one fails. This has shown that participants are influenced by system-wide trust (SWT). What has
been missing is an investigation into what types of people succumb to SWT effects. The current study attempts to replicate SWT findings
and identify possible predictors of individuals likely to be influenced by SWT. The findings did demonstrate a replication of SWT.
The study found that ‘‘feelings of negativity when automated devices fail’’ was a significant predictor of SWT theory.
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Introduction
Previous research in terms of system-wide trust (SWT) has studied how operator’s trust in an automated single device
may be affected when it fails (Dixon & Wickens, 2006; Dixon, Wickens, & Chang, 2005; Dixon, Wickens, & McCarley,
2007; Geels-Blair et al., 2011; Keller & Rice, 2010; Lee & Moray, 1994; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000; Rice,
2009; Rice & Geels, 2010; Rice et al., 2008; Wickens & Colcombe, 2007; Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001). The SWT
effect is also seen when multiple devices are included in the study (Geels-Blair, Rice, & Schwark, 2013; Keller & Rice,
2010; Rice & Geels, 2010). Operators tended to group multiple devices together, and if one device failed, trust in the entire
system was reduced and treated as unreliable.
The following sections will define SWT and discuss the concepts of trust in automation. This will support the need for the
study and the implications that SWT theory has on consumer perceptions.
Automation and Trust
Wickens and Hollands (2000) define automation as a mechanical or electrical task of work that would aid or replace
the human operator. There are four stages of automation that have been identified: synthesis, diagnosis, response selection,
and response execution (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). Automation can be used to assist a human operator
with tasks that may be unsuitable for a human to accomplish. However, it has been identified by several researchers
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(e.g., Meyer, 2001, 2004; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997;
Rice, 2009) that automation errors can cause distrust and
the system being ignored completely.
Social psychology defines trust as a construct that
involves the predictability of another person (Deutsch,
1958; Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Ergeneli, Saglam, & Metin,
2007). Research has shown that this construct can be rela-
ted in human interaction with automated systems (Reeves
& Nass, 1996; Rice, 2009; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
When a human places a high level of trust in another
person, it is believed that they will accomplish what is
expected of them, and this is viewed as a positive inter-
action (Lee & See, 2004). These interactions can be
extrapolated to understand how humans would interact
with machines, thus allowing the concept of trust to be
applied when using automated systems and demonstrating
how it varies when components do not operate as expected
(Geels-Blair, Rice, & Schwark, 2013).
The increase in the use of automation over the last few
decades also adds a factor of complexity. Operators can over-
come the complexity of a system by augmenting supervision
and using trust in automation. Trust and reliance in auto-
mation allow for adaptive behavior when complete under-
standing in a situation is impractical (Lee & See, 2004).
The failure in automation when multiple aids are used is an
important aspect that researchers are interested in studying
(Keller & Rice, 2010; Rice & Geels, 2010).
Previous research has identified a positive relationship
with respect to the shift in operator trust levels and the
reliability of the automated aid. An operator will rely on the
aid if a high level of trust exists (Parasuraman & Riley,
1997; Rice, 2009). Moreover, recent studies have shown
that operators group multiple aids as one system and that if
one aid is deemed unreliable, the operator is seen to treat all
other aids as unreliable (Geels-Blair, Rice, & Schwark,
2013; Keller & Rice, 2010; Rice & Geels, 2010). This
supports the SWT theory.
System-Wide Trust Theory
Prior research focused on single-aid devices and the
relationship of automation trust (Maltz & Shinar, 2003;
Meyer, 2001, 2004; Rice, 2009). The research involved
pairing operators with only single automated devices.
Keller and Rice (2010) examined whether participants had
system-wide or component-specific trust when multiple
aids were used in a system. Component-specific perception
infers that an operator would place his or her trust separately
between the different aids and would act according to the
perceived reliability of the specific aid itself. If one aid failed,
the operator would still continue to trust the other aid. SWT
occurs when the operator disregards the reliability of an aid
as an independent entity and treats the reliability based on
the system as a whole. In other words, when one aid is
unreliable, the level of trust that the operator has toward the
other aids would be adversely affected.
Keller and Rice (2010) tested these two theories by using
a simulated flight task. In the experiment, the operator was
assigned to check for system errors in two gauges while
flying an unmanned aerial system simulator. The percen-
tage of reliability varied in each condition by either being
100%, 85%, or 75% reliable. The choice to ignore or agree
with the aid was up to the participant. In this study, the data
supported the SWT theory and that one unreliable aid
negatively affects the trust in the other reliable aids. The
limitations of this study involved sample size and number
of gauges. The small sample size was from the same
university, thus limiting generalizability. Furthermore, the
use of only two gauges meant that the unreliable aid
accounted for 50% of the system.
A later study conducted by Rice and Geels (2010)
included four gauges in the experiment to increase the ratio
of perfect to imperfect aids from 1:1 to 3:1. A single-task
paradigm was used. Moreover, misses were used instead of
false alarms to investigate whether the system-wide affect
still occurred. Similar results to the previous experiments
were obtained, demonstrating that the participants were still
influenced by the effects of SWT.
Another study involved the use of eight gauges to
investigate SWT (Geels-Blair, Rice, & Schwark, 2013).
The adverse effect of false alarms and misses on operator
trust was examined. In this study, one of the eight gauges
was either 100% or 70% reliable and included either false
alarms or misses. The data depicted that an operator would
still group the reliability of the system regardless of the
number of automated aids, thus supporting SWT. Further-
more, this study revealed that false alarms correlated with a
stronger SWT effect than misses. This study used a larger
sample size, allowing for a more accurate effect size.
A recent study examined the level of trust in automation
when a group of European participants were given a
hypothetical scenario (Winter, Rice, & Reid, 2014). In the
first scenario, a group of participants were asked to imagine
that they were on a flight where the oxygen masks falsely
deployed. They were then asked to rate their trust in the
automation that operates the oxygen masks, autopilot
system, airplane flaps, landing gear, and seat video monitor
on a Likert-type scale from 23, indicating extreme distrust,
to +3, indicating extreme trust. A neutral option of zero
indicated neither trust nor distrust. A separate control group
was asked to rate their trust in the automation system given
the same scenario without the failure.
The results showed that participants rated their trust high
when the system did not fail; however, there was a clear
drop in trust in all the automated devices for the condition
where the oxygen mask deployed incorrectly. That is, trust
in all the other automated devices was pulled down when
compared to the control group, indicating that the SWT
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effect was influencing participants’ trust in the automated
devices that were unrelated to the failed device.
Other research has also indicated that a level of trust and
familiarity has a role in pilots’ belief in automation reliability
and its functioning capacity (Mehta, Rice, & Winter, 2014).
While it is difficult to prove that SWT is a major contributor to
particular accidents, there have been many incidents and
accidents involving interaction with GPS tools in both the
aviation and maritime industries (Johnson, Shea, & Holloway,
2008). A prime example of this was in November 2004 when
a C-212-CC twin-engine aircraft flew into terrain due to lack
of hazard monitoring and overreliance on GPS alarms.
Current study. Previous research has shown a strong effect
of SWT across several paradigms. However, there is a
missing gap in the literature that we hope to fill. Specifically,
no study that we know of has looked at what types of people
tend to succumb to SWT effects. The goal of this study is
twofold. First, we would like to replicate the previous find-
ings to ensure the robustness of the SWT effect in hypo-
thetical situations using samples from different countries.
Second, we wish to determine if there are any possible
predictors of SWT and if those predictors replicate across two
paradigms. In two studies, participants were given scenarios
about an airplane flight or a rental car trip. In the experimental
conditions, participants were told about an automated device
failure. They were then asked to rate their trust in both the
failed device and other unrelated devices located on the same
airplane/car. We predicted that the SWT effects seen in
previous studies would replicate to this paradigm and that we
would find a significant predictor of SWT effects.
Study 1 Methods
Participants. Ninety-four participants (29 females) from
the United States took part in the study via an online
survey. The mean age was 33.93 (SD 5 10.11).
Materials and recruitment. The study was presented
online using FluidSurveysH. Participants were recruited
via Amazon’sH Mechanical TurkH (MTurk). MTurk is a
global online service that enables participants (Turkers) to
participate in human intelligence tasks (HITs) in exchange
for monetary compensation. Participation in any HIT is
voluntary and anonymous.
Procedure. Participants first signed an electronic consent
form. They were then presented with the following
scenario: ‘‘Imagine that you are flying on a 4-hour
commercial airplane flight from one major city to another.
Sometime during the flight, an alarm goes off throughout
the cabin and oxygen masks fall from the compartments
above passenger seats. Following this, the pilot comes on
the intercom and says that there was a mistake and the
automation that operated the oxygen masks failed. He says
that there is no actual emergency and not to worry. The
pilot then tells you the altitude of flight and how long it will
be before you land.’’ In a separate baseline condition,
participants were given the same scenario without the failed
oxygen mask situation.
Participants were then asked to rate their trust in the
automation that operates the oxygen masks, autopilot
system, airplane flaps, landing gear, and seat video
monitor on a Likert-type scale from 23 (extremely
distrust) to +3 (extremely trust) with a neutral option of
zero (neither trust nor distrust). Following this, partici-
pants were asked to provide the following demographic
information: gender, ethnicity, age, income, number of
flights per year, flight mileage per year, proficiency at
interacting with automated devices, frequency of inter-
action with automated devices, knowledgeability about
automated devices, feelings of negativity when automa-
ted devices fail, strength of fear of flying, and highest
education level.
Design. Different participants were randomly placed in
the experimental and control conditions, and all participants
provided ratings for all the different automated devices.
Study 1 Results
Compliance with statistical assumptions. The data were
analyzed for compliance with applicable regression and
analysis of variance (ANOVA) assumptions, which inclu-
ded correct specification of the form of the relationship
between the independent variables and dependent variable,
correct specification of the independent variables in the
regression model, reliability, constant variance of the
residuals, independence of the residuals, and normality of
the residuals. The data was found to have met all statistical
assumption requirements.
Figure 1 presents these data. A two-way ANOVA using
Condition as a between-participants factor and DeviceType
as a within-participants factor revealed a main effect of
Condition, F(1, 92) 5 53.10, p , .001, gp2 5 .37; a main
effect of DeviceType, F(4, 368) 5 40.13, p , .001, gp2 5
.30; and a significant interaction between the two factors,
F(4, 368) 5 38.16, p , .001, gp2 5 .29. These data reveal
that there was an SWT effect that replicates findings from
previous studies.
Next, each participant’s score in the failure condition
was subtracted from the average score for all participants in
the baseline condition for each automated device. These
scores indicated how much trust had dropped from a
situation where there was no failure to a situation where
there was a failure. These difference scores were then used
as the criterion variables in two regression analyses. In the
first analysis, the difference score for the unreliable device
was the criterion variable, with gender, ethnicity, age,
income, number of flights, flight mileage, proficiency,
frequency, knowledgeability, feelings of negativity, fear of
flying, and highest education level used as possible pre-
dictors. We used stepwise regression to eliminate ineffec-
tive predictors. The resulting model included one of the
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original predictors. Feelings of negativity when automated
devices fail significantly predicted loss of trust scores,
b 5 .403, t(47) 5 3.02, p 5 .004, in the device that failed.
This model accounted for 16% of the variance in the
criterion, F(1, 47) 5 9.13, p 5 .004. These results indicate
that the stronger the feelings of negativity when automated
devices fail, the more there is loss of trust when an auto-
mated device fails.
A second regression analysis was conducted using the
average difference scores for the remaining devices
(i.e., the devices that did not fail) with the same predictors.
The resulting model again included one of the original
predictors. Feelings of negativity when automated devices
fail significantly predicted loss of trust scores, b 5 .453,
t(47) 5 3.48, p 5 .001, in the devices that did not fail. This
model accounted for 21% of the variance in the criterion,
F(1, 47) 5 12.14, p 5 .001. These results indicate that the
stronger the feelings of negativity when automated devices
fail, the more there is a loss of trust during SWT loss.
Study 1 Discussion
The purpose of the study was twofold. First, we
wanted to replicate findings from previous studies in a
design using hypothetical scenarios. Our hypothesis was
that the SWT effect would present itself even though the
participants were only told hypothetical information
about the devices. This prediction was supported by the
data. There was clearly a loss of trust in the unreliable
device, and this loss of trust spread to the other devices
despite participants not having any information about
their reliability.
The second purpose of the study was to determine if any
demographic predictors could help explain why partici-
pants tend to succumb to SWT effects. The data revealed
one significant predictor. Participants who tended to feel
more negatively about automation that fails also tended to
lose more trust in the devices described in the scenario. We
discuss the implications of this finding in more detail in the
general discussion.
Study 2 Introduction
Study 1 presented both a replication of the previous
findings and a possible predictor for SWT effects. The goal
of Study 2 was to replicate this finding in a different
paradigm. In this study, participants were given a scenario
about a rental car.
Study 2 Methods
Participants. One hundred twenty participants (49 females)
from the United States took part in the study via an online
survey. The mean age was 35.11 (SD 5 11.14).
Materials and recruitment. Study 2 was identical to
Study 1 with the exception that the scenario was in regard
Figure 1. Data from Study 1. SE bars are included.
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to a rental car. Participants were presented with the
following storyline: ‘‘Imagine that you are driving on a
4-hour trip from one major city to another in a rental car.
Sometime during the drive, the low-fuel warning light
comes on. However, when you stop and check the fuel level,
the gas tank is almost full. You realize that the low-fuel
warning light is not working properly.’’ In a separate
baseline condition, participants were given the same
scenario without the failed low-fuel warning light situation.
Participants were then asked to rate their trust in the
automation that operates the low-fuel warning light, the
cruise control system, the backup camera, the power steer-
ing system, and the antilock brakes. Following this, parti-
cipants were asked to provide the same demographic
information as provided in Study 1 except that two driving-
specific questions were added: how many times and how
many miles a year the participant drives (on average).
Study 2 Results
Compliance with statistical assumptions. The data were
analyzed for compliance with applicable regression and
ANOVA assumptions, which included correct specification
of the form of the relationship between the independent
variables and the dependent variable, correct specification
of the independent variables in the regression model, reli-
ability, constant variance of the residuals, independence of
the residuals, and normality of the residuals. The data was
found to have met all statistical assumption requirements.
Figure 2 presents these data. A two-way ANOVA using
Condition as a between-participants factor and DeviceType
as a within-participants factor revealed a main effect of
Condition, F(1, 118) 5 56.95, p, .001, gp25 .33; a main
effect of DeviceType, F(4, 472)5 53.58, p, .001, gp25 .31;
and a significant interaction between the two factors,
F(4, 472) 5 51.24, p , .001, gp2 5 .30. These data reveal
that there was a general SWT effect that replicates findings
from Study 1 and previous literature.
The resulting regression model for the unreliable device
criterion variable included one of the original predictors.
Feelings of negativity when automated devices fail signifi-
cantly predicted loss of trust scores, b 5 .381, t(59) 5 3.16,
p 5 .002, in the device that failed. This model accounted
for 15% of the variance in the criterion, F(1, 59) 5 14.55,
p 5 .002. These results indicate that the stronger the feelings
of negativity when automated devices fail, the more there is a
loss of trust that occurs when an automated device fails.
A second regression analysis was conducted using
the average difference scores for the remaining devices
(i.e., the devices that did not fail) with the same predictors.
The resulting model again included one of the original
predictors. Feelings of negativity when automated devices
fail significantly predicted loss of trust scores, b 5 .428,
t(59) 5 3.64, p 5 .001, in the devices that did not fail. This
model accounted for 18% of the variance in the criterion,
F(1, 59) 5 19.80, p 5 .001. These results indicate that the
stronger the feelings of negativity when automated devices
fail, the more there is a loss of trust during SWT loss.
Figure 2. Data from Study 2. SE bars are included.
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Study 2 Discussion
The data from Study 2 replicated that of Study 1. First,
the SWT effect again remained strong. Second, the data
revealed one significant predictor: participants who tended
to feel more negatively about automation that fails also
tended to lose more trust in the devices described in the
scenario.
General Discussion
In the current study, we examined the SWT effect in two
settings (commercial flight and rental car) to examine
whether this effect remains strong even in hypothetical
situations and what might predict loss of trust in similar
automated devices simply due to a failure in one presum-
ably unrelated device. Clearly, there are two important
findings stemming from the current set of studies that
shed further light on the research conducted in SWT. First,
SWT is a robust phenomenon, and not just when tested in
simulated behavioral settings (Keller & Rice, 2010; Rice &
Geels, 2010; Geels-Blair, Rice, & Schwark, 2013). The
data reveal that a loss of trust in the unreliable device
spread to other devices despite participants not having any
information about their reliability. Moreover, SWT appears
to show up in a variety of environments. In this case, SWT
manifests itself in both airplane and automobile modes.
There is no evidence at this time to indicate that similar
results would not be anticipated using other automated
contexts, regardless of platform; further research will need
to explore this possibility.
Second and perhaps related to the first point, SWT
appears in participants regardless of gender, ethnicity, age,
income, etc. The only significant predictor insofar as the
demographic factors included in this study was feelings of
negativity when automated devices fail. This latter finding
is not altogether surprising; however, what is surprising is
that none of the other demographic factors explained why
participants tend to succumb to SWT effects. In this case,
what we didn’t find is quite revealing. This indicates that
SWT is a widespread phenomenon and undoubtedly a power-
ful influence on how participants perceive their automated
systems, regardless of a number of personal characteristics.
Few findings in behavioral research are as compelling
as what we found here in SWT, particularly given our large
sample size. Of course, other demographic factors or per-
sonal characteristics may indeed predict a participant’s
response to automation unreliability. While this is exciting
data in a nascent area (this theory was just developed a few
years ago), we recognize that this is still a starting point,
and future research will be conducted by the current authors
to examine additional demographic or personal variables
and their relationship to SWT.
Given that the current findings were derived from survey
data only (subjective opinion), an important question that
needs to be investigated is whether these findings will
remain intact and manifest themselves in participant behav-
ior with actual operators of the system under investigation.
Thus, in the first example used in this study (airplanes),
would we see the same results, either in subjective opinion
or more interestingly in actual behavior, if our participants
were trained operators of aircraft (i.e., pilots). It is always
possible that there is a dissociation between what people
say and what they would actually do in a specific cir-
cumstance; however, it should be noted that the original
SWT effect was developed using behavioral data, so we
do not expect any major deviations from what we have
found here.
Future research needs to test this assumption and
determine if the SWT predictor found here also appears
in specific operator behaviors, such as decision making in
the cockpit. For example, would pilots who tend to react
negatively when automated devices fail be less likely to
trust unrelated automation if one system is unreliable and,
as a result, be less likely to use reliable and independent
automated systems, such as in an emergency situation? If
this were the case, then we would have the potential for a
serious safety of flight issue. Pilots would not use other
automated systems when the use of such systems could
mitigate an evolving emergency situation. How best to deal
with such an eventuality is a critical research issue. Most
likely, we would have to either redesign displays to make it
apparent that they refer to systems that are in reality
independent and/or develop modifications to existing
training programs to make pilots aware of this possibility.
More to the point, what do the current study’s results
mean for operational personnel today? At the very least, we
need to inform operators that the phenomenon exists in the
first place. Once so informed, operators can take into
account the state of affairs at any given moment in time and
determine whether there are any significant links between
automated systems.
The question here is not so much how do we reduce or
eliminate feelings of negativity when an automated device
fails. This is probably a realistic assessment and one that
is not easily trained out of operators. The real issue is
the ability to assess when there is system dependency
or whether automated systems function independently.
The best method for instilling this is with proper training
and knowledge of how these various automated systems
function together. We don’t want pilots, for example, blindly
accepting what an automated system is doing. Rather,
we want pilots to have sufficient knowledge of how the
automation functions so they can make informed decisions
and make assessment as to the reliability of the automation.
Limitations
There are several limitations of this study that we wish to
point out. First, our data was collected using a hypothetical
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situation rather than a real-world scenario. However, for
obvious ethical and logistical reasons, it would be virtually
impossible to collect real-world data for these types of
situations. Second, our data is limited to online participants
from the United States, specifically those participants who
share the MTurk environment. While several research
studies have shown that MTurk data is as valid and reliable
as university participant pools (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, &
Gosling, 2011; Germine et al., in press), we still acknowl-
edge the limitations of the sampling procedure and the
issues it generates with external validity. It would be
prudent to caution generalizability due to the nature of
the data collected. Third, a regression analysis does not
necessarily show causal relationships. We acknowledge
that future research should be conducted in order to test the
relationships noted here in a more controlled experimental
environment. Fourth, it is well known that automation
errors have differential effects on operator trust (e.g.,
Meyer, 2001, 2004; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Rice,
2009). In the current study, we only presented scenarios
where the automated devices false-alarmed. Further research
should investigate situations where the automated devices
miss an event.
Practical Implications
We wish to note at least two practical implications of this
study. First, it is critical for designers of systems to
understand why people succumb to the ubiquitous SWT
effect (Keller & Rice, 2010; Rice & Geels, 2010; Geels-
Blair, Rice, & Schwark, 2013; Winter, Rice, & Reid,
2014). While these data are preliminary and can only
represent a starting point for understanding the predictors
of SWT, they do point to an interesting possibility that
much of the SWT effect might be due to emotional factors
rather than cognitive ones. When designing a new system
with complex multiple displays and automated devices, it is
important to be aware of how a failure in one device might
trigger an SWT effect and subsequent loss of trust in other
devices within the system.
Second, as mentioned above, it is important for operators
and those who train them to understand what is happening.
It is said that opaque automation systems, meaning systems
that are not clear in terms of usability to the user, degrade
trust (Rice, 2009); it might also be argued that opaque
explanations for phenomena such as the SWT effect might
also have negative effects on operator trust and training
methodologies. If operators are trained to become aware of
the SWT effect and how easy it is to succumb to it, they
might be more resistant to its effects and act in a more
rational manner. This conclusion, however, is only margin-
ally supported, as the samples did not include any pilots.
Their attitudes are divergent than those from the general
population, and SWT is an essential necessity of their
successful work.
Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to determine if there are
any significant predictors of the SWT effect. Via a
regression analysis across two studies, the data clearly
show that there is at least one significant predictor and that
this predictor has a very strong effect on SWT. We con-
clude that feelings of negativity when automated devices
fail appears to drive the SWT effect to a large degree,
accounting for up to 21% of the variance in the data. This
study has strong practical implications for designers of
complex automated systems.
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